Arguments for God existing in time or out of time have been discussed with length in the history of humans. One of the better arguments for the existence of God as being timeless is done in "The God Beyond Time" by Hugh J. McCann. Although McCann formulates a good argument for the timelessness of God, he fails to provide a clean defense against God's temporal omniscience. The only way to derive the resolution to this issue is to insist upon the difference between completely accurate prediction and instantaneous knowledge of all actions in the world as the component of God's omniscient power.

McCann argues that the timeless God is more plausible than the temporal God because the temporal God would have limited knowledge of the world and would therefore be unable to claim omniscient power. He insists that the free will of humans undermines the ability of a temporal God to accurately predict their actions. "If the behavior of rational agents is free in the sense described -- and it is often claimed that moral responsibility requires this -- then no conditions obtain in advance that would enable God to predict such behavior with certainty. It seems the only way he could avoid mistakes would be by an incredible series of lucky guesses or by simply not entertaining beliefs about future free actions." (Pojman 251). However, this is a poor explanation for why this is the case.

McCann first says that agents in the world must be free for moral responsibility to be prudently discussed. This shall be allowed him at the moment, although later analysis may be done to undermine this view also. However, he then claims that there are, "no conditions obtain in advance that would enable God to predict such behavior with certainty..." This clearly seems to be a diversion of the reader from inquiry into such an issue. Using the idea of a presupposed omniscient God, we can then construct the two ways in which omniscience might be possible.

Under a temporal framework, God would be encompassed within the current mode of "present" that all other humans experience. As such, he would be knowledgeable of everything currently happening as well as everything that has happened in the past down to the minutest detail. It is not unlikely, then, to say that since God possesses this knowledge, and knows every detail, through the power of his predictions he can always and accurately predict the future. McCann states that these would only be "lucky guesses", but this is clearly false. If one had knowledge of all of the particles affecting the machine that picks the lottery as well as the exact timing, speed, and direction of said particles, would it not be possible that every prediction of the results would be absolutely correct? This would no longer be a "guess" as a guess leaves open the possibility of one being wrong. Instead, it would shift to knowledge of exactly what was going to happen, given the relative place that the predictor currently existed in time. Therefore, as a temporal God, he could easily state what the future would hold for humanity without violating his own temporal status and yet not guessing but stating with complete accuracy the exact events yet to come to the "present" timeframe in which he resides.

Likewise, in the case of a timeless God, he would instead be outside of the flow of time and experience all happenings, "in a single act of awareness whose content comprises all of history." (Pojman 251). This McCann accurately describes, and using his explanation, one can see that God's omniscience now rests between a rock and a hard place. On the one side, a temporal God experiences the present along with knowledge of the past, with the powers to predict the future completely accurately. On the other hand, God is not within time and yet knows of every instance of every happening all in the same moment. At first glance, both of these positions seem to allow the omniscience of God and there is little to argue in the way of the difference between the two.

However, there is an important difference between the two arguments. In the former, God's knowledge is composed of a memory of the past, an instantaneous knowledge of the present (which is unmeasurable), and a perfect prediction of the future. The latter states that God's knowledge is known all at once from the beginning to the end of time. It seems that these types of knowledge are not equivalent. In the first, three different types of knowledge hold true for God: past, present, and future. The second has only one type of knowledge, eternal. It would be incorrect to label the timeless God's knowledge as knowledge of the "present," since being outside of time temporal terms do not apply to God's mental states, including his knowledge. However, it would be correct to state that the timeless God has the same point of view on the entirety of events as the temporal God has on the events of the present. Hence, there are seemingly four different types of knowing that God may be privileged to understand. Eternal does not equal (past + present + future) because of the point of view which encompasses their nature. God knows the past as something that has already happened but is no longer happening. The present is known as the currently occurring events and the future is known as that which will become. Each section has additions to it as point of views and thereby makes difference in knowledge. The equation can now be written as such: (eternal + PoVEternal)=((past + PoVPast) + (present + PoVPresent) + (future + PoVFuture)). It can now be seen that this equation has no merit, and a clear distinction has been made between a temporal and a timeless God.

The next task to accomplish is making the case for the timeless God over a temporal God. As stated above, one can regard the knowledge of temporal God in the present as being equated with the knowledge of the eternal God in relation to the point of view from which it is taken. Clearly the two bodies of knowledge are not the same, but are of the same structure. (PoVEternal=PoVPresent) Both versions of God view the knowledge of these two instances in the same light, as all happening at the same time. The only difference is that the knowledge that the timeless God has also has relations of events in order, whereas the temporal God's present view has no need for this order since the events are instantaneous.

Omniscience is defined as "all-knowing". What is inherent in this statement? All-knowing of what? "To know" is to have mental certainty, without doubt, of the truth-value of a statement. Hence, I know that unicorns do not exist because "unicorns exist" has the truth-value of false. I also know that apples do exist, because "apples do exist" has a truth-value of true. I do not know a truth-value, however, in relation to a statement like, "I am driving my car" in reference to the fact that I will drive my car on Saturday. When Saturday arrives and I am behind the wheel of my car traveling down the highway, then I may accurately make the statement, "I am driving my car". I may also make the statement today, Friday, that, "On Saturday I will drive my car". Both statements have truth-value of true. However, I can not make the statement, "I am driving my car" today in reference to the time when I will drive it on Saturday.

Likewise the temporal God may only make statements that things will happen, not that they are or have, unless they are currently in the present or past. Future happenings can not be stated to be happening, because they are not occurring (from a temporal being's point of view.) This does not undermine the truth that the events will indeed happen, as God's perfect prediction will ensure this. However, a truth-value about such events can not be claimed until they occur. The timeless God, on the other hand, may claim the truth-value for any statement about the world, since the point of view of this God is such that every event is occuring in the entirety of his knowledge. There are no "unhappened" events to make truth-values appear for which do not exist yet.

The difference between the knowledge of a temporal God and knowledge of a timeless God is the distinction that makes the most difference in determining God's omniscient power, the nature of knowledge in God's being itself. McCann's argument, though good, lacks this important enhancement to cover up the holes left. By adding this into the argument, a plausible idea of a timeless God is very possible.